In this article, we investigate developments in Danish health care policy. After a short presentation of its historical roots, we focus on the decades after the administrative reform of 1970, which shaped the current decentralized public health care system. Theories of path dependency and institutional inertia are used to explain the relative stability in the overall structure, and theories of policy process and reform are used to discuss gradual changes within the overall framework. Although comprehensive reforms have not taken place in Denmark, many gradual changes may pave the way for more radical changes in the future. The political climate currently seems to be more favorable toward structural reform than in the past.
In contrast to many other European countries, there have been no comprehensive structural reforms in Danish health care since 1970. Danish health care policy has been characterized by a strong commitment to the welfare state principles of integrated public services delivered through a decentralized democratic management structure. However, within the broad path of the decentralized public system, there have been a number of gradual organizational and managerial changes. Some of the new organizational elements have been introduced locally, whereas others have been implemented nationally. The many new organizational and managerial elements have increased the complexity of the system and added additional layers to the structure of health care policy. Some of the changes have prepared the way for more radical decisions, and some represent immediate challenges to the coherence and manageability of the system. Combined with increasing critiques of the current system and changes in the political climate, windows of opportunity have arisen for more radical changes, in spite of the fact that the decentralized system has performed relatively well according to a number of traditional indicators, such as budget control and patient satisfaction (Christiansen 2001) . The aim of this article is to (1) provide explanations for the stability in overall structures in health care since 1970, (2) analyze the reasons for and the impact of the many gradual managerial and organizational changes within the overall structure, and (3) discuss the potential windows of opportunity for more radical changes.
Analyzing Stability and Change

Theories Explaining Stability
Two sets of theories seem particularly relevant for explaining stability in governance structures: path dependency perspectives (Pierson 2000) and institutional inertia perspectives (March and Olsen 1989) . Both use a systems-level approach to explain stability, and in combination they provide a powerful set of concepts covering both rational and cultural forces that explain stability. Paul Pierson primarily uses the economic theory of increasing returns to explain path dependent processes. Increasing returns refers to situations in which the relative benefi ts of the current activity, compared to alternative activities, increase over time. The costs of exit or switching to some previously plausible alternative rise over time due to large setup or fi xed costs, sunk costs, learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations (Pierson 2000: 254) . Pierson argues that the theories of path dependency and increasing returns are very relevant for explaining social systems and organizational and institutional structures and may provide a set of rational explanations for stability. Could other factors infl uence the choices made by decision makers in health care? Perhaps theories that emphasize the normative institutional structures for social actions can provide an answer. James March and Johan P. Olsen (1989) stress the role of institutions and suggest that many social actions are guided by rules of thumb, habit, and tradition rather than rational deliberation in the sense proposed by economic theory. There are several reasons for this, including the infl uence of existing power structures and the limited cognitive capacity of human actors. The result is a tendency to keep developments within the paths set out by historical choices and the gradually developed social and cultural norms that are tied to the established structures.
Both Pierson and March and Olsen argue that political institutions and the nature of political processes tend to reinforce path dependent developments. This is particularly due to the collective nature of politics; the status quo bias of political institutions; power asymmetries related to current confi gurations; and the institutional density, complexity, and opacity of politics (Pierson 2000: 257) . Moreover, according to March and Olsen, the normative and cultural perceptions guiding political actors tend to limit perspectives for identifying problems and viable solutions. Thus, there are several theoretical explanations for stability and path dependency. Rational arguments, institutional structures, and the broader political and cultural contexts are all important factors in explaining path dependent developments in health care (Wilsford 1994; Tuohy 1999; Immergut 1992) . However, path dependency theories do not predict completely static systems, but only that changes will tend to stay within certain paths until the system is shocked or something erodes or swamps the mechanisms of reproduction that generate continuity. Douglass North (1990: 98-99) expresses this in the following way: "Path dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision making through time. It is not a story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future." To discuss the potential for change, we need to supplement the theoretical ideas of path dependency and institutional inertia with considerations of political change dynamics.
Theories for Analyzing Change and Windows for Political Reform
A number of political science perspectives address the issues of change dynamics and potential for pathbreaking policy changes (Kingdon 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) . From these perspectives, we suggest the following set of factors may be particularly relevant for analyzing health-policy changes: economic factors, such as global economic forces and developments in the national macroeconomic situation; demographic change, such as aging populations and changes in disease patterns; and national socioeconomic policies, such as changes in fi scal policies and policies pertaining to the organization and development of public-sector services (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000) . These broad factors interact with other social dynamics, such as the introduction of new management ideas as a result of local or national policylearning processes (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) , through import and translation of fashionable international management trends (Røvik 32 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 1998), and changes in the political climate and composition of coalitions among policy elites. Such changes may be driven by strategic considerations, changes in resource distribution, changes in voting behavior, or changes in the distribution of seats in parliamentary assemblies (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) . The timing and trajectory of changes may also be infl uenced by fl ukes, chance events, disasters, scandals, and breakdowns, which put health care on the public agenda and force politicians to react (Kingdon 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000) . Figure 1 illustrates the different change factors.
The four types of factors illustrated in fi gure 1 can interact in several ways. There may be ongoing social and cultural changes or macroeconomic developments that make policy elites seek new solutions, for example, by looking at international trends in management thinking (Kingdon 1995) . The process may speed up due to critical events or new data on the state of affairs in health care (ibid.; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000) . The process might be initiated by the import of new fashionable ideas and the subsequent search for problems on which to apply the ideas (Røvik 1998) . In this process, the actors may produce evidence of malfunctions or breakdowns to promote particular solutions.
Windows for political change arise in relatively rare instances in which problems, solutions, decision opportunities, and actors are joined (King- 
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don 1995). Some of the underlying pressures for change may be present for long periods without the occurrence of policy windows. Policy entrepreneurs can play an important role in joining problems to solutions in the political world, and policy learning may be more or less prominent in the change processes (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) . Some changes are generated bottom up from organizational and decentralized problem solving, whereas others are top down. In sum, there are numerous possibilities for different change dynamics and change trajectories. Next we will describe and analyze the various changes in the Danish health care system based on the theoretical concepts of stability and change as presented above. We will start with a short historical description.
Historical Paths and Current Structure
Denmark has a long tradition of public welfare provision and decentralized welfare administration (Vallgårda 1989) . After the Reformation in 1536, a vacuum arose in organizing to help the people in need, including sick and disabled people, as most of the monasteries closed down and the church lost its income. During the following 150 years, help to the sick and disabled was based on assistance from landowners and artisan masters or by reciprocal care between the peasants. The central administration attempted to improve the conditions from the beginning of the 1700s by organizing a poor relief system, based on the local parish or town. In reality, not very much was changed, however. The central state laid down guiding principles, but most welfare measures were provided by local authorities, which is still the case today. The roots of the welfare system thus date back to the eighteenth century, and the prominent role of local public authorities as welfare agents may provide a partial explanation for the relatively positive attitude toward the state in Denmark (as is the case in the rest of Scandinavia). By the end of the nineteenth century, public hospitals had been built in most Danish towns. Moreover, the Danish health care sector has always been fi nanced predominantly by taxes raised at parish, town, and county levels. Church-based philanthropy and charity have played a relatively minor role in welfare provision in Scandinavia. Since the 1930s, the state has subsidized hospitals to an increasing degree but exerted limited formal infl uence.
Danish welfare politics in general, and health care politics in particular, have traditionally been characterized by consensus regarding basic institutional structures (Vallgårda 1999) . Since World War II, political parties on all sides have supported the idea that access to health care should be independent of ability to pay or place of residence. Between 1945 and the 1970s, health care politics were also characterized by the strong infl uence of the medical profession, and issues were usually discussed in technical rather than political terms.
A major administrative reform in 1970 created larger municipalities and institutionalized local democratic governance as a dominant principle in Danish welfare policies. The municipalities were given responsibility for educational, social, and some public-health-related tasks, including retirement facilities, home nursing, and dental care for children and adolescents, while fi nancing and provision of health care per se became county responsibilities. At the same time, there was an important change from specifi c and direct state subsidies to general block grants and county-level taxation. Although subsidies were based on activity, and hence reduced the marginal costs of an activity as seen from the county, a block grant is based on objective criteria, such as, for example, population size and age composition. This meant that, from then on, directly elected county councils were responsible for both delivery and fi nancing beyond the block grants.
The health care system, shaped by the 1970 reforms and through subsequent adjustments, can be characterized as a public integrated health system with universal access, which is free at the point of delivery (except for co-payments on dentistry, physiotherapy, and pharmaceuticals). Delivery and fi nancing are county-level responsibilities but take place within a national regulatory framework and a set of agreements between central and county authorities. The average number of inhabitants in the fourteen counties is 332,000 (ranging from 45,000 to 600,000). In addition to the county hospitals, the health care system consists of private general practitioners and practicing specialists fully or partly reimbursed by the counties plus the municipal services previously mentioned. There are regulatory, advisory, and coordinative responsibilities at the national level but no direct responsibility for the delivery of services.
Health care system fi nancing is through general taxation at county and national levels, with mechanisms for redistribution from central to county level and between counties based on demographic and economic criteria. Personal income taxes cover approximately 81 percent of the county expenses, general block grants from the state cover 13 percent, and real estate taxes cover 6 percent. Health care accounts for approximately 70 percent of the total expenditures of the counties. Private hospital providers play a very limited role in Danish health care (less than 1 percent of hospital beds). General practitioners (GPs) work in private practices, and there are also privately practicing specialists, but both groups are closely integrated into the public system via agreements and regulation. Voluntary health insurance is growing, and it is estimated that currently 30 percent of the population has insurance against co-payments (Danmark 2000) and 15 percent of the population has insurance that allows access to private providers or pays a lump sum in cases of critical illness (Mossialos and Thomson 2002) .
Payments to hospitals are predominantly via global budgets, but limited activity-based payment is being introduced based on Danish diagnosis-related group (DRG) classifi cations. Payment to GPs is a combination of capitation (approximately one-third of income) and fee for service to provide a mix of incentives (see Johansen 1995 for more details). GPs act as gatekeepers to the health care system for 98 percent of the population. Two percent of the population has chosen an alternative public coverage, which gives direct access to specialist services (but not hospitals) when paying a co-payment. This can be seen as a historical residue and has been maintained to provide extra fl exibility in the system. The option is mainly used by patients with long-term conditions, and previous studies have shown a social and geographical bias in the usage. The fact that slightly less than 2 percent use this option is seen as a sign of general satisfaction with the public referral system.
In recent decades, the health care sector has attracted more political attention and the power of the medical profession has been challenged. Simultaneously, there has been a rise in political-administrative and economic rationales in health care (Bentsen et al. 1999) . Changes in the composition of management and particularly the introduction of more economic and managerial staff have contributed to this trend. The main public stakeholders in health care traditionally have been the political parties, national ministries (particularly the Ministry of the Interior and Health and the Ministry of Finance) and agencies (particularly the National Board of Health), and county and municipal democratic assemblies and administrations. In negotiations with the government, counties are represented by the private Association for County Councils and municipalities by an organization called Local Government Denmark. Universities and various public or semipublic research institutes also have an interest in health policy. The main private stakeholders are the professional trade unions, especially the Medical Association and the Nurses Association. The trade unions are infl uential through their role in national negotiations over wages and working conditions. They are also important in political hearings and various corporate commissions on health care.
However, since the 1980s, the Medical Association has no longer been automatically represented in all health care commissions. Other private stakeholders include the pharmaceutical industry and the various patient organizations. The media play an important role in raising issues, indicating a growing public interest in health, and news stories tend to be more critical of the system than they may have been in the past.
Explaining the Consensus behind the Decentralized Health Structure
The present confi guration of the health care system is a result of historical paths and political choices based on preferences for public welfare services and equity. The institutional structure of the Danish political system and the normative traditions favoring cooperation and broadly negotiated solutions are important in explaining path dependent developments since 1970.
Equity considerations are an integrated part of Danish culture, as refl ected in the high level of income redistribution and the comprehensive set of policies on social welfare, education, and health, which have explicitly sought to amend inequalities. The development of the public system of health care was supported by policy elites and professional interests and plays an important role in the general legitimacy of the modern welfare state (Vallgårda, Krasnik, and Vrangbaek 2001) . Concerns for equity have played a major role in restraining initiatives such as closure of hospitals, privatization, and user fees. These concerns are thus a major factor that keeps the system within the public welfare path.
Decentralized democratic management and the division between local and central policy-making bodies have added to the path dependency in the system due to vested interests and the creation of countervailing powers. The counties traditionally have been very adamant defenders of their political autonomy, and this has been backed by a general political preference for decentralization of powers in the Danish welfare system in order to bring decision making closer to local conditions and preferences. The two traditionally largest political parties (the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party) have shared this preference for decentralization, and both have had strong representation (and interests) at the decentralized levels, which has tended to restrain initiatives from the national-level party leaderships.
The central political level in Denmark has been characterized by a tradition of minority governments and consensus seeking in important policy areas. This has created a policy process that is more prone to incremental decisions than large reforms, because support must be secured from the major interests within Parliament and among the major stakeholders. In addition, there has been limited political disagreement over general health care issues. This has kept the system sheltered from serious political controversy, creating a tendency to discuss health care in technical and medical terms and, since the 1980s, in economic and cost containment terms. Thus, it can be argued that the structure of central political institutions, along with multilevel governance structures, have contributed to the path dependent development of the system. Professionals, politicians, and policy makers have generally agreed on the main features of the system and have had common interests in expanding a specialized health system (Vallgårda 1999 ). The consensus has been self-reinforcing due to adaptive expectations. Actors have tended to take the status quo for granted and have directed their attention at incremental changes. The system has also been characterized by high degrees of patient satisfaction compared to other countries.
In terms of functionality, general consensus among experts and policy elites is that there are no acute problems or breakdowns in the system, although there have been discussions on waiting times, lack of economic incentives, and concerns for particular areas such as heart disease and cancer treatment, which have led to special national policy programs in those areas. A number of government commissions and several international experts have pointed to the advantages of the current system and lack of clear evidence of the benefi ts of alternatives (Christiansen 2001) . The arguments have been very similar to Pierson's observations on increasing returns due to start-up costs, sunk costs, and coordination and learning benefi ts in the present system.
The coalition of interests during the primary expansion period of an increasingly specialized health care system (the 1950s to the 1980s) was succeeded by a strong national concern for macroeconomic goals. Economic and administrative rationales started to challenge professional interests, and subsequent ideas for change have been weighed against macroeconomic objectives (Bentsen et al. 1999 ). The strong emphasis on expenditure control was caused by a general economic recession and poor state fi nances after the mid-1970s. The liberal/conservative government in power from 1983 to 1992 focused heavily on limiting growth in public expenditure, and the decentralized structure has generally performed well in pursuing the policy objective of expenditure control. Therefore, it has been diffi cult to argue for alternatives. During the Social Democratic coalition government between 1992 and 2002, the economic situation was more favorable and health care expenditures were allowed to increase at a controlled rate. The economic context and the national economic focus have thus been important factors in shaping the boundaries for health policy (Vrangbaek 1999) .
Overall, these issues (institutional structure and political system dynamics, division of responsibilities and early decentralization of democratic management, lack of evidence for failure or breakdown, strong emphasis on equity, and the national economic situation and focus) have created a powerful set of historical and institutional factors that have formed the current system and maintained stability within the chosen path of a decentralized and integrated health care system in Denmark. Governance, ownership, fi nancing, and delivery of health services have remained predominantly public, and the decentralized nature of the system has been maintained.
However, within this general framework, there have been a number of gradual managerial and organizational changes. Some of the changes have been introduced locally and have spread through lateral processes, whereas others have been national, top-down measures. The pace and number of change initiatives accelerated during the 1990s. At the same time, there has been an increase in the levels of political attention given to the health sector (Christensen 2000) , and voices for more radical change have become increasingly prominent. In the following section, we will look at some of the changes already introduced and the reasons for their introduction.
Gradual Adjustments: Overview and Results
As in many other countries, the main Danish policy themes for the 1980s were controlling the growth in health expenditure and containing costs. In Denmark, the primary instruments for achieving these aims were the development of annual negotiated agreements between the government and the Association of County Councils on the size of the county budgets in the health sector and the use of global budgets for hospitals. The negotiated agreements include broad development targets, general subsidy levels (state to county), and average tax rates for the counties. The agreements can potentially be backed up by legislation or by withholding block grants, but usually normative pressure is enough. National-level politicians, on the other hand, are committed to compensating for any extra expenditure that is imposed on the counties through new legislation. This principle was introduced during the 1980s.
During the 1990s, most counties introduced contracts for their hospitals. The contracts typically include activity, service, and quality targets in addition to the global budget. The contracts are not legally binding but can be sanctioned administratively, and they are generally viewed as important instruments for engaging in dialogue over targets and achievements (Jespersen 2001 ). There also have been experiments with decentralizing budget responsibility to the hospital departmental level (Pallesen 1997) . The development of negotiated agreements, global budgeting, and decentralized responsibility were part of the general modernization program of the liberal/conservative government in the 1980s. It is interesting to note how international ideas of competition via a purchaser-provider split were not implemented by this government due to the risk of losing macroeconomic control and the perceived benefi ts of the existing structure. Hospitals are still integrated in the county governance structure, and the negotiated contracts can be seen as refi nements of the regular planning and control system, allowing for decentralized input and greater fl exibility in applying resources as long as the objectives of the contracts are met. Hospitals cannot contract with other county councils without permission from the home county, and hospitals are seen as integrated parts of their home county hospital systems, although to some extent competing for the allocation of funds.
The various measures for controlling growth in health expenditure have been relatively successful. During the 1971-2000 period, real health expenditure per capita in Denmark increased by an annual rate of 2.0 percent, whereas the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average was 3.8 percent. During the 1980s, the growth rate remained at the very low rate of 1.0 percent (compared to the OECD average of 3.0 percent), but increased gradually to 3.1 percent from 1997 to 2000 (the OECD average was 3.3 percent) (OECD 2002 (OECD , 2001 ). There have been some earmarked increases, for instance, to support a planned expansion of the capacity for treating heart and cancer patients.
As a share of gross domestic product (GDP), health care expenditures grew by 0.3 percentage points between 1971 and 2000, the lowest change among the OECD countries (where the average was 2.9 percent). The share fell from 9.1 percent in 1980 (OECD, 6.9 percent) to 8.4 percent in 1998 (OECD, 8.2 percent). These fi gures are based on the Danish contribution to OECD statistics and include the cost of nursing and elderly care in nursing homes and community care. It is diffi cult to determine the extent to which these fi gures are comparable to fi gures from other OECD countries, as the inclusion or otherwise of social care costs across the different countries is not transparent. Moreover, the fi gures may be overestimated for political reasons (Pedersen 1999) . Without these items included, the health care system's share of Danish GDP was a more modest fi gure of 6.6 percent in 1988 and 6.4 percent in 2000 (Ministry of Health 2001 . Public funding decreased by 1.8 percentage points in the period 1970-1998, from 83.7 percent of total health expenditure in 1970 (compared to the OECD average of 71.8 percent) to 81.9 percent in 1998 (OECD, 75.2 percent), during which time it increased by 3.4 percent in the OECD as a whole (albeit with substantial cross-country variations). Thus, co-payments and private payments increased slightly in Denmark. Although co-payments rose in areas where they already existed (dentistry, pharmaceuticals, physiotherapy), no new areas, such as GP consultations or hospitalization, were subject to them. The policies on co-payments and experiments with price freezes, price cuts, reference prices, generic substitution, and practice guidelines have led to a more controlled expansion of expenditure on pharmaceuticals. However, there are continued concerns over pharmaceutical expenditure trends, and a new reimbursement system was introduced in 2000 (see Vallgårda, Krasnik, and Vrangbaek 2001) . Measured in U.S. purchasing power parity, the consumption of pharmaceuticals was US$197 per capita in 1998 (with the OECD average being US$256). Thus, general administrative and health policies, and their implementation via decentralized authorities, have proven to be relatively successful in achieving one policy objective-macroeconomic control. However, the effort has generated critiques from both professionals and patients claiming that success has come at the expense of service levels, quality, and investment in new technology (Høiby 1999; Lund 1997 ). This type of criticism has fueled many of the subsequent policy debates.
During the 1990s, a number of other new initiatives were introduced into the system. The policy focus on expenditure control was supplemented with concerns for micro-effi ciency, service and quality levels, choice, and fl exibility in service delivery. This led to the introduction of a wide number of policy instruments, with ideas often being imported from other sectors, including the commercial sphere, and from debates within the international health policy community.
The creation of the Copenhagen Hospital Cooperation, which joined the hospitals in Copenhagen and Frederiksberg municipalities with the national state hospital in 1995, is an example of a structural change that was driven by budget overruns and administrative problems in the Copen-hagen area. It was also inspired by the new public management ideas of arm's-length management and professional boards. However, the Danish version of this was a management board consisting of appointed (and mostly political) representatives from the Copenhagen and Frederiksberg municipalities and the state. This has restrained the managerial autonomy of the board, and the Copenhagen Hospital Cooperation operates as, and is perceived to be, a regular county for most practical purposes. The structural change was thus adjusted to fi t existing patterns.
Choice of hospital, regardless of county borders, was implemented in 1993 by the Social Democratic government. It was initially proposed by a liberal/conservative government but gained support from most parties after being modifi ed through the parliamentary process. In theory, the introduction of choice could challenge the planning capacity of the counties, as patients can now exit their local county and seek treatment in other public hospitals at the expense of the home county. However, with the agreement of all major parties, the scheme was implemented with weak economic incentives for receiving counties and hospitals. Choice was restricted to the same level of specialization, and receiving hospitals could refuse access when long waiting lists existed. The initial impact was therefore limited (Vrangbaek 1999) . The economic incentives have since increased as DRG rates (based on estimated average costs within each DRG group) are now used instead of low fl at rates. There is also more information available, as expected waiting times and quality indicators (number of treatments) are posted on the Internet. This has led to a gradual increase in cross-county border treatments, and the most recent fi gures state that 9 percent of nonacute patients were treated outside their home county in 2000 compared to 5.5 percent in 1994 (Sundhedministeriet 2001) . Most of the activity affected by patient choice relates to hospitals located close to county borders with historical and geographical links to patient groups in other counties. Choice is also mostly used for relatively simple surgical procedures (e.g., eye surgery, orthopedics). Surveys indicate that patients tend to prefer treatment close to their homes and that preferences are not exclusively tied to waiting times (Vrangbaek 1999 ; see also Brouwer et al. 2003 for similar conclusions on choice in the Netherlands). Intracounty choice is less well documented. The limited evidence shows tendencies similar to cross-border choice (i.e., the preference for proximity), but evaluation is diffi cult due to ongoing structural changes (e.g., the concentration of specifi c health care tasks and functions in one place within the county).
Effi ciency in the use of resources has been addressed by a number of initiatives, such as negotiated contracts between counties and hospital management, department-level budgeting, and substitution to ambulatory care. National initiatives such as the introduction of the case-mix/DRG system have improved the possibility to analyze productivity (but have probably also increased the administrative costs in the system). There is limited research on the effect of individual policy initiatives, but the general effi ciency in use of resources can be evaluated in terms of activity, compared to the budget. Table 1 illustrates some of the trends on hospitals and activity levels. The increase in admissions and occupancy rates and the decrease in average length of stay and number of bed days indicate more intensifi ed levels of care and improvements in the effi ciency of resource use. An important trend is the relatively successful effort to increase the frequency of outpatient treatment (Sundhedsministeriet 2001) . Other likely reasons for effi ciency gains are the ongoing county-level attempts to rationalize services; the use of contracts (as described above); and improved knowledge of cost and activity structures in the system, for example, as a result of preparing for the DRG system.
In sum, the activity-level changes described in table 1, along with the controlled budget increases and population growth, especially among the elderly, indicate an increased effi ciency in the hospital sector. In the same period , the number of consultations with private practicing physicians per capita increased 18.0 percent (OECD average, 22.6 per- cent). The latter may be explained in part by a substitution of inpatient treatment for consultations with private practice physicians. The number of private practice physicians per 1,000 people is higher than the OECD average (3.0) and stood at 4.4 in 1999. It is worth reiterating that the Danish population's general satisfaction with its health care system is close to the highest in the European Union, although it has been falling in recent years (Mossialos 1997; Eurobarometer 1998) . The confounding effect of lifestyle makes it diffi cult to assess the effectiveness of the health care sector in terms of outcome. The relatively slow increase in life expectancy in Denmark has been a matter of concern. It is believed to be mainly caused by unhealthy lifestyle rather than a lack of health care or excessive waiting times, although concerns over the quality of treatment of heart disease and cancer have led to special programs in those areas. The Government Program on Public Health and Health Promotion was presented in 1999 to address lifestyle and prevention issues (Sundhedsministeriet 1999) . Self-reported daily smokers among people over fi fteen years old measured 31 percent (compared to an OECD average of 28.2 percent), and alcohol consumption in liters per person above fi fteen years old was 11.6 liters per year in 1998 (OECD average, 9.9 liters). Female life expectancy increased by 1.9 years between 1970 and 1998 (compared to the OECD average of 6.7 years), whereas male life expectancy increased by 2.9 years in the same period (OECD, 6.1 years). Female potential years of life lost (PYLL) decreased by 30 percent between 1970 and 1998 (OECD, 49 percent), whereas for males the fi gure was 28 percent (OECD, 45 percent). Compared to neighboring countries, Denmark is still performing poorly in terms of PYLL, although life expectancy again began to increase during the late 1990s, with the rate of increase being greater than in many comparable European countries. The latest fi gures show expected lifetimes of 74.5 years for males and 79.2 years for females in 2001. This recent positive development is generally ascribed to the targeting of lifestyle factors via general campaigns and local and practice-level activities. Despite their relatively poor life-expectancy record, a large share of Danes (77.9 percent) report that, in general, they perceive their health to be very good or good (Kjøller and Rasmussen 2002) .
Waiting times have been high on the public agenda, although they have generally been shorter than in England and similar to those in Sweden (Sundhedsministeriet 1999) . This has led to political initiatives setting waiting-time guarantees for selected treatments in 1993 , the newly elected liberal/conservative government issued a gen-eral waiting-time guarantee of two months for all types of treatment. If waiting times exceed two months, patients are free to choose treatment at private facilities or abroad at the expense of the home county. This measure was combined with an activity-based scheme for distributing an input of an additional DKK 1.5 billion (US$0.23 billion, 2003 exchange rate; total expenditure on hospitals was DKK 47 billion [US$7.32 billion] in 1999). One interesting feature of the scheme is that the counties were bypassed when setting the criteria for distributing these funds, with the funds going directly to the hospitals. The preliminary results show increased activity levels, but the goal of a two-month maximum waiting time has not been met in all areas. Relatively few patients have sought treatment at private facilities-5,531 patients during the fi rst six months, of which 131 patients chose treatment abroad (Association of County Councils 2003).
Experiences with previous waiting-time guarantees have been mixed. Efforts targeting heart disease and cancers generally have been considered to be successful (Sundhedsministeriet 2001) . In other areas, there have been activity-level increases, but this has not always resulted in lasting reductions in waiting times, as referral patterns seem to have changed and patient expectations seem to have risen (Vrangbaek 2001) . Further, some have suggested that waiting-time guarantees have diverted resources from areas such as internal medicine and geriatrics to more easily quantifi able areas such as elective surgery.
Quality has been addressed by a number of national and county-level initiatives. It has been linked to restructuring and centralization of services (Sundhedsstyrelsen 1998) , and there have been efforts to organize quality management via a national quality development strategy (Sundhedsstyrelsen og Sundhedsministeriet 1993 ). An important recent effort has been the attempt to develop national indicators that can be used to compare the quality of different hospital departments. This project has focused on six areas so far: lung cancer, schizophrenia, heart failure, hip fracture, stroke, and acute surgery for gastrointestinal bleeding. The effects of the various measures have not been evaluated.
Equity of access to services is still a major policy goal in Denmark. There are no comprehensive studies showing changes in this parameter, but some of the recent policies (choice, activity-based fi nancing, etc.) are believed to favor younger, wealthier, and more mobile patient groups over elderly, psychiatric, and internal medicine patients.
Many of the traditional policy themes (waiting times, effi ciency, choice, quality, etc.) have remained high on the agenda, but in recent years there has been a tendency to place more emphasis on developing general perfor-mance systems (accreditation, national quality indicators) and economic incentives (activity-based payment) to achieve policy aims. Table 2 summarizes the main policy themes and initiatives. It should be noted that the separation into decades is approximate and that policy themes tend to persist, so that the mix of actual policies becomes increasingly complex.
Interpreting the Gradual Changes
Growing public and political attention has led to the introduction of many new initiatives. The background for such changes can be found in sociodemographic, technical, and cultural changes affecting the demand side of health care and economic and political factors affecting the supply side. These social, demographic, and cultural changes have translated into greater pressure on the public health care system and more or less clearly articulated demands within the political system. These demands have interacted with a strong focus on macroeconomic control from the 1980s onward.
The political responses have been a number of gradual change initiatives. Many of the initiatives (e.g., choice, contracting, accreditation) refl ect the importation of international health management ideas as well as generic developments in public policy, but the new ideas have generally been transformed in the national decision-making process to fi t the institutional structure of the Danish system and the objectives of macroeconomic control (e.g., choice and contracting). We can conclude that although many international policy themes and instruments have been introduced in Denmark, this has not led to comprehensive structural reform as it has in several other countries (Ham 1997) . The institutional forces favoring gradual development have been too strong and there has been a lack of convincing arguments for breaking from the established path.
The many policy adjustments and the relatively positive results, in terms of traditional macro indicators (Christiansen 2001) , have not silenced the critics or weakened political interest in health care issues. Illustrations of continued criticisms can be found in the public debate (Lund 1997) , in the increasing number of formal complaints lodged over treatment, and in the rising number of parliamentary questions and debates over health care (Christensen 2000) . The parliamentary debates indicate an increasing frustration at the central policy level with being held accountable for perceived shortcomings, yet being unable to directly control the counties. The counties, on the other hand, are increasingly frustrated by the government's tendency to interfere in local decisions on service delivery. These tensions between the county and the national levels have been particularly evident since the liberal/conservative government came to power in late 2002. It appears that the county-level politicians have lost infl uence within the liberal party and that the party leadership believes that a more ideological profi le on health care may be benefi cial even if it comes at the counties' expense.
Windows for Further Change
How can we explain the continued political attention and the apparent erosion of consensus over the county's role as a health provision institution? Using the theoretical path dependency and institutional inertia framework, we can point to both structural and political explanations. In terms of structure, it can be argued that underlying demographic, economic, and cultural changes continue to challenge the system. These pressures have already led to gradual responses. However, the many gradual and partly uncoordinated changes may also have contributed to an erosion of the institutional structure that traditionally held the system together and created coherence. In terms of governance, there is increasing tension between the use of hierarchical planning instruments, such as global budgeting and health plans, and elements of market mechanisms, such as competition and activity-based fi nancing. Coordination and planning of services at the county level has become more diffi cult as patients (and payments) move more freely across county lines and the level of activity-based fi nancing is increased. Moreover, some of the counties are economically strained and have diffi culties attracting personnel. This severely reduces their possibilities for adjusting to the new situation. Choice and improved patients' rights have challenged the traditional medical and bureaucratic control within the system and represent a general movement from loyalty and voice toward exit as the dominant medium for articulating preferences (Hirschman 1970) . The issue of human resources and the outlook for a further increase in the human resource gap, combined with increasing specialization and technological developments, are in themselves likely to become driving forces for change in the future and are indeed already contributing factors in the many ongoing restructuring efforts (e.g., closing and combining of hospital units).
In terms of central versus decentralized management, there are tensions between the principle of county autonomy and the increasing interference from the central level of government. The annual budget agreements have become increasingly detailed, and there is a stronger tendency for national-level politicians to interfere via legislation or by exerting pressure on the counties. Management via standards and accreditation represents other governance instruments that challenge county-level autonomy by setting national standards regardless of local conditions and preferences.
In terms of public versus private, there are pressures to foster new types of partnerships, but at the same time this creates a need for new regulative structures to handle such developments. The growth in private voluntary health insurance, the inclusion of private for-profi t hospitals in waitingtime initiatives, and the limited experiments in some counties with the sale of hospital units to private enterprises are examples of new private involvement within the Danish health care system. The impact on planning, expenditure levels, and equity is still uncertain.
In sum, there seems to be a number of tensions as the many gradual policy measures are slowly pushing the system from one dominant governance structure (public decentralized health care with integration of fi nancing, ownership, and provision) to a new structure with several overlapping and partially competing governance principles and new combinations of fi nancing, ownership, and provision. In terms of the political climate, it seems that the dominant policy elites have changed views. The attention on health care has increased as other policy areas have been internationalized and in response to growing demands. Many nationallevel politicians seem frustrated with the lack of direct control, and the counties are increasingly seen as outdated elements in a political world in which the most popular change models seem to be new public management ideas (e.g., quasi-markets, contracting, and depoliticized arm'slength management), as opposed to the traditional concern for local democratic government.
Changes in sociodemographics and the political climate and the importation of international ideas and their local interpretation are thus important underlying factors for prompting change. The shift to a conservative/liberal government in November 2002 with a more confrontational attitude toward the counties may provide a window for breaking the traditional path. The government commissioned a study on the distribution of tasks and responsibilities within the public sector and the fi nal report was published in January 2004 (Ministry for the Interior and Health 2004). The report lists a number of problems with the current distribution of responsibilities and presents alternative options. In terms of health care the most radical models would eliminate the counties and move responsibilities for health to either (larger) municipalities or the state. A political agreement on structural reform was reached in the summer of 2004. The reform maintains three political levels, but the fi fteen county units (thirteen counties plus Copenhagen and Bornholm) are to be replaced by fi ve regions with health care as their main task and directly elected political boards. The number of municipalities will also be drastically reduced through mergers. Somewhat surprisingly, the government has chosen to break the tradition of having responsibility for management and fi nancing at the same political level, as fi nancing will be a combination of central tax-based fi nancing (80 percent) through activity-based payment and block grants, and municipal tax-based fi nancing (20 percent) through a combination of per capita and activity-based payment. The idea is to get more control at the central level and to create stronger incentives for the regions to service the municipalities. The reform is supposed to be implemented by January 2007.
The reform follows the current path by maintaining three levels and democratic management of health care at the regional level. However, it can also be seen as a partial departure, or at least a turn in the road, for the tradition of decentralized control, as the counties are dismantled and the state takes direct control over fi nancing and generally strengthens its capacity in terms of planning, coordinating, and setting standards. A limited reform with somewhat bigger political units at the regional level was
